After rising rapidly for several years, U.S. house prices fell sharply in many markets during 2007 and 2008 . Falling house prices brought a sharp rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures, which prompted numerous proposals to relieve distress in mortgage markets. On July 30, 2008, President Bush signed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which, among other provisions, included a $300 billion increase in FHA loan guarantees to encourage lenders to refinance delinquent home mortgages.
Other proposals then under consideration included (i) directing Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, the two main government-sponsored enterprises that purchase and securitize home mortgages, to refinance subprime mortgages; (ii) permitting states to refinance loans at risk of foreclosure through the issuance of federal tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds; and (iii) creating a new federal corporation to purchase distressed mortgages from investors and convert them to long-term fixed-rate mortgages. Barr (2008) and Pollock (2008) . and the creation of the Federal National Mortgage Corporation to purchase FHA-insured loans.
State and local governments also responded to mortgage foreclosures during the Depression, mainly by changing state laws governing foreclosure. Several states enacted temporary foreclosure moratoria. Others made permanent changes that limited the rights or incentives of lenders to foreclose on mortgaged property. In 2008 a number of U.S.
states considered similar steps to reduce mortgage foreclosures, and legislation for a national moratorium was introduced in the U.S. Congress. This paper takes a look back at the Great Depression experience and identifies differences and similarities with the current period of distress in housing and mortgage markets.
2 As with the current episode, the increase in mortgage defaults during the Depression was preceded by a period of extensive home building and rising house prices and an increasing use of debt to finance house purchases. Defaults rose sharply in the early 1930s when house prices and household incomes collapsed. This paper documents the severity of housing and mortgage market distress during the Great Depression and describes major initiatives by state and federal governments to deal with the crisis. The paper focuses in particular on the moratoria imposed by 27 states to limit foreclosures, and on the activities of the HOLC, which was the principal vehicle by which the federal government sought to resolve delinquent home mortgages.
MORTGAGE DISTRESS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The Great Depression was a cataclysmic event. Figure 1 , increased from 3.6 per 1,000 home mortgages in 1926, the first year data are available, to a high of 13.3 per 1,000 mortgages in 1933. In that year, on average 1,000 home mortgages were foreclosed every day (Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1937, p. 4) . Many more homes were at risk of foreclosure-as many as half of urban home mortgages were delinquent on January 1, 1934 (Bridewell, 1938, p. 172) .
4
The sharp increase in mortgage distress during the Great Depression was the result of precipitous declines in income and real estate values following a period of rapid growth in mortgage debt outstanding (Wheelock 2008a) . A rising level of debt does not necessarily pose a problem for borrowers, provided their incomes and wealth are sufficient to make loan payments. However, between 1929 and 1932, personal disposable income and nonfarm residential wealth fell 41.0 percent and 25.7 percent, respectively, whereas the value of nonfarm residential debt fell a mere 6.8 percent. As shown in Figure 2 , nonfarm residential mortgage debt increased sharply relative to nonfarm residential wealth during the 1920s and continued to rise until 1932. Moreover, falling house prices, shown in Figure 3 , meant that homeowners who were having difficulty making their mortgage payments were increasingly unlikely to sell their homes for more than the outstanding balances on their loans.
Many home mortgages in the 1920s and 1930s were short-term, nonamortizing loans that typically were refinanced on maturity. 5 Refinancing usually was easily accomplished during the 1920s, when household incomes and property values were generally rising, but next to impossible during the Depression. Falling incomes made it increasingly difficult for borrowers to make loan payments or to refinance outstanding loans as they came due. The failure of thousands of banks and other lenders made refinancing difficult even for good borrowers; customer relationships were severed and the costs of credit intermediation rose (Bernanke, 1983) . The mix of falling household incomes and property values and short-term, nonamortizing loans resulted in soaring mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates.
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FORECLOSURE RELIEF LEGISLATION
The first attempts to reduce foreclosures during the Great Depression focused on encouraging lenders and borrowers to renegotiate loan terms through mediation boards and other voluntary arrangements. However, the clamor for compulsory foreclosure moratoria grew louder as the Depression worsened and the number of foreclosures rose. foreclosures. Over the subsequent 18 months, a total of 27 states and the federal government enacted legislation to limit or halt foreclosures (Skilton, 1944, p. 78 Several states directed their state courts to grant moratoria in deserving cases, but little guidance was provided to the courts about how to determine which borrowers deserved relief. For example, in Iowa, the court was authorized to grant a borrower's request for relief from pending foreclosure unless "good cause is shown to the contrary" (Skilton, 1944, p. 82) . Similarly, an Arizona statute specified that "In pending or future real estate mortgage foreclosure suits, the court may order a two-year continuance unless good cause to the contrary is shown" (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. A-3) . Not surprisingly, the extent to which courts granted relief to delinquent borrowers varied widely, even within a state. Many courts determined that it was pointless to grant relief to borrowers who had no hope of refinancing their mortgage or making payments or who did not act in good faith toward their lender (Skilton, 1944, pp. 98-106) . In addition, courts often required borrowers to pay rent or interest to the lender, as well as taxes, as a condition for halting foreclosure proceedings.
In conjunction with a foreclosure moratorium, several states extended the period during which a mortgagor could redeem his property after foreclosure. Again, however, any extension of the redemption period was often left to the court's discretion. In Kansas, for example, "the period for redemption on real estate may be extended for such additional time as the court shall deem it just and equitable" (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. A-10) . In a few states, the legislation was more specific. For example, North Dakota legislation specified that "The period within which a mortgagor or judgment debtor may redeem from a mortgage foreclosure or execution sale of real estate…is extended for a period of two years…" (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p.
A-21).
Several states also modified their statutes to limit deficiency judgments. Some states restricted judgments to the difference between the outstanding loan balance and a "fair" or "reasonable" value of the mortgaged property, rather than the difference between the loan balance and the price received at a foreclosure sale. For example, a 1933 Idaho statute specified that "no deficiency judgment may be entered in any amount greater than the difference between the mortgage indebtedness, plus the cost of foreclosure and sale and the reasonable value of the property" (Central Housing
Committee, 1936, p. A-7). Other states permitted courts to invalidate foreclosure sales for less than fair value. Most states left the determination of fair value to the discretion of a local appraisal board or court rather than attempt to define "fair value" in statutes.
Several states imposed new limits on the length of time that a lender could seek a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale. For example, Iowa and Ohio enacted legislation limiting deficiency judgments to two years after a foreclosure sale (Skilton, 1944, p. 130 The 27 states that adopted foreclosure moratoria during 1933 and 1934 are listed in Table 1 , and the geographic distribution of states with moratoria is shown in Figure 4 .
Moratoria were especially common among states in the Midwest and Great Plains, but they also were imposed by several states in the Northeast and Far West. Foreclosure moratoria were less common in New England, the Southeast, and Mountain West. Foreclosure moratoria generally applied to both farm and nonfarm residential mortgages. However, the pressure for foreclosure moratoria was particularly intense in midwestern states where farm foreclosure rates were especially high ( Figure 5 ).
Moratoria were less common in states with relatively low farm foreclosure rates, though a few, including New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, also imposed moratoria, and according to Skilton (1944) , some states imposed moratoria in response to high numbers of nonfarm home mortgage foreclosures.
Alston ( One immediate effect of mortgage relief legislation during the Depression was reduced farm foreclosure rates (Rucker and Alston, 1987) . 12 However, critics argue that foreclosure moratoria induce lenders to restrict the supply of loans and raise interest rates to compensate for the possibility that their right to foreclose on delinquent loans or to collect deficiency judgments will be constrained. Hence, over the longer run, foreclosure moratoria and other changes in mortgage laws may have made loans costlier or more difficult to obtain. According to a 1936 federal government report, Statutes which provide a lengthy, expensive, complicated or otherwise burdensome foreclosure procedure, or which interpose a long period of redemption before title and possession to the mortgaged property can be obtained, have a tendency to increase interest rates and security requirements throughout the jurisdiction, since prospective lenders naturally take into account the procedure available for realizing the debt out of the security when determining the conditions on which they will be willing to make loans. (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. 3).
The same report noted that in 1933-34 many states elected to disregard such objections because it was widely believed that "unrestricted foreclosure of farm and home mortgages under the circumstances prevailing at the time would have deprived large numbers of persons of essential shelter and protection, and would have left them without the necessary means for earning a living. Such wholesale evictions might have seriously endangered basic interests of society" (Central Housing Committee, 1936, p. 2) .
Hence, in many states, the societal costs of widespread foreclosures were viewed as 12 I am unaware of any research on the effects of relief legislation on nonfarm home mortgage foreclosure rates.
exceeding the costs of reduced loan supply and higher interest rates borne by prospective borrowers. Even lenders may have benefited from foreclosure moratoria in the short run.
Although individual lenders had an incentive to foreclose to recoup losses on delinquent mortgages, a high number of foreclosures in an area could reduce property values and thereby cause still more foreclosures. Thus, a foreclosure moratoria might halt a downward spiral in property values that could benefit lenders as a whole.
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Although the economic and societal benefits of lower foreclosure rates are difficult to measure, research shows that the foreclosure moratoria of the Great Depression did impose costs on future borrowers. Alston (1984) investigates the impact of foreclosure moratoria in an empirical model of the farm mortgage market. He argues that foreclosure moratoria encouraged lenders to reduce the supply of loans, resulting in fewer loans made and, possibly, higher average interest rates. Consistent with this hypothesis, Alston (1984) finds that private lenders made significantly fewer loans in states that imposed moratoria and tended to charge higher interest rates on the loans they did make.
Rucker (1990) extends Alston's (1984) study to investigate differences in the impact of mortgage relief legislation on the supply of loans offered by different types of private lenders. In the 1930s, most farm mortgages were issued by local commercial banks, private individuals, insurance companies, and federal land banks. Insurance companies tended to be larger and more diversified and to have a lower cost of funds than did banks and individual lenders. Their size and cost advantages enabled insurance 13 Kahn and Yavas (1994) examine the short-and long-run effects of changes in foreclosure laws (especially how they affect borrower and lender behavior and borrower welfare) in a simple theoretical model of the mortgage market in which renegotiation of loan contracts is possible. Jaffe and Sharp (1996) describe the economics of foreclosure moratoria in the context of alternative legal theories of contracts.
companies to attract lower-risk borrowers and, consequently, experience lower delinquency rates. Insurance companies generally were also more willing to grant extensions to delinquent borrowers. Hence, the costs imposed by mortgage relief legislation should have been lower for insurance companies than for other private lenders. Rucker (1990) finds that, indeed, mortgage relief legislation led to significantly larger reductions in the supply of loans from commercial banks and individual lenders than from insurance companies. 14 Both Alston (1984) and Rucker (1990) conclude that mortgage relief legislation caused significant reductions in the aggregate supply of loans in states that enacted such legislation.
The findings of Alston (1984) and Rucker (1990) on the effects of mortgage relief legislation during the 1930s are consistent with other studies that find significant effects of state mortgage laws on local lending markets. Meador (1982) , for example, finds that loan interest rates tend to be higher in states with lengthy or costly foreclosure processes or those that prohibit deficiency judgments. More recently, Pence (2006) finds that mortgage loans are, on average, some 3 to 7 percent smaller in states in which foreclosure requires a court action than in states with nonjudicial foreclosure processes, again consistent with the hypothesis that the supply of loans is lower in states in which foreclosure is more costly.
FEDERAL RELIEF
During the Depression, foreclosure moratoria were widely viewed as expedients to buy time for the economy to recover and for the federal government to initiate 14 In his econometric analysis, Rucker (1990) treated legislation that limited deficiency judgments or enhanced redemption rights for borrowers, as well as foreclosure moratoria, as forms of relief legislation, whereas Alston (1984) focused exclusively on moratoria. 15 Pence (2006) compares bordering census tracts located in different states and controls for a variety of borrower, policy, and other census tract characteristics.
programs to refinance delinquent mortgages (Skilton, 1944, pp. 73-77 replaced this program with a system of federal subsidies for local government housing projects (Doan, 1997, pp. 39-42) .
In addition to programs aimed at providing affordable housing, the federal government took several steps to alleviate distress in mortgage markets. Table 2 Interest on securities issued by the HOLC was exempt from federal, state, and local income taxes, and the payment of interest was guaranteed by the federal government.
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The HOLC was permitted to acquire delinquent mortgages on properties with an appraised value of up to $20,000. 17 HOLC loans were limited to 80 percent of the appraised value of the underlying property or a maximum of $14,000, whichever was less. The HOLC sometimes permitted junior liens (second mortgages) on properties against which it held the first mortgage, but refused to permit the total obligations on a property to exceed 100 percent of the appraised value. Further, the HOLC made loans only to those homeowners it deemed likely to have sufficient income to make their loan payments (Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 1936, p. 10) . Nearly half of the loan applications received by the HOLC were rejected or withdrawn (Harriss, 1951, p. 1) .
Although many home loans at the time were short-term loans with little or no amortization of principal, the HOLC restructured the loans it acquired as 15-year, amortizing loans at a fixed maximum interest rate of 5 percent.
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The HOLC was authorized to conduct its own property appraisals and did so based on three considerations: (i) market value at the time of the appraisal, (ii) the cost of a similar plot of land at the time of the appraisal plus the reproduction cost of the building minus depreciation, and (iii) the value of the premises, by capitalizing the reasonable monthly rental value over a 10-year period immediately preceding the appraisal date (Harriss, 1951, p. 41) . Harriss (1951, pp. 41-42) HOLC often counseled delinquent borrowers and readjusted payment schedules rather than moving quickly to foreclosure when borrowers fell behind on their payments. On average, HOLC loans were delinquent for two years before foreclosure (Harriss, 1951, p. 73).
Because the HOLC refinanced distressed loans, its foreclosure rate was higher than that of other lenders. For example, the foreclosure rate on loans made by life insurance companies during 1933-36 was a mere 2.6 percent, compared with nearly 20 percent for the HOLC (Harriss, 1951, p. 71) . The limitation that HOLC loans not exceed 80 percent of a property's appraised value probably held down the agency's foreclosure rate, as did its policy of lending only to those borrowers who had a reasonable prospect of being able to service their loan. Furthermore, most HOLC loans were made somewhat after the trough of the business cycle, and rising household incomes helped to limit loan default rates.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the HOLC contributed to a rebound in the housing market, let alone to the macroeconomic recovery. One study of countylevel data found little association between HOLC lending and changes in housing values or homeownership rates between 1930 and 1940 (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2001 ).
Nevertheless, in helping to clear a million delinquent loans from the books of private lenders, the HOLC undoubtedly contributed to the resumption of private mortgage lending.
The to Saulnier (1956, p. 10) , mortgage underwriting standards deteriorated before the downturn of the 1930s, as they did toward the end of the recent housing boom. However, unlike the recent experience, the main cause of mortgage loan distress during the 1930s was the sharply contracting economy and falling price level. One estimate is that, on January 1, 1934, about half of all mortgages on urban, owner-occupied houses were delinquent. 24 Not surprisingly, this level of distress prompted numerous local, state, and federal actions to relieve and reform mortgage markets.
The earliest calls for mortgage relief were in farming regions, and states with high farm foreclosure rates were more likely to impose foreclosure moratoria, though urban mortgage distress or other factors appear to have influenced the decision to impose moratoria in some states. For example, in New York, lobbying by commercial real estate interests helped shape legislation for a broad moratorium covering farm, urban residential, and commercial real estate mortgage foreclosures.
In most states, foreclosure moratoria were limited to borrowers who had some chance of paying or refinancing their loans. Relief often was denied to borrowers judged to have little prospect of ever paying off their mortgage.
Foreclosure moratoria resulted in both winners and losers. Although the rights of lenders to foreclose on collateral or to seek deficiency judgments were restricted, relief legislation did apparently contribute to a reduction in farm failures. The extent to which moratoria limited declines in property values and therefore the total number of mortgages at risk of foreclosure is unknown, however. Research has found that future borrowers bore some of the cost of debtor relief in the form of reduced loan supply and higher interest rates. The evidence from the use of foreclosure moratoria during the Great Depression demonstrates how legislative actions to reduce foreclosures can impose costs that should be weighed against potential benefits.
The federal government tackled the problem of delinquent mortgage loans directly by creating the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which purchased delinquent loans from their originators. The HOLC purchased some one million loans, which it refinanced as long-term, fixed-rate, amortizing loans payable in monthly installments.
Arguably, the HOLC was highly successful. Despite acquiring only delinquent loans, the HOLC ended up foreclosing on fewer than 20 percent of the loans it refinanced.
Furthermore, the HOLC operated without a direct taxpayer subsidy (other than its initial $200 million capitalization, which it eventually repaid, and free access to government services). The HOLC did, however, refuse many loans on the grounds that the borrower lacked the income to make loan payments. The HOLC also loaned no more than 80 percent of the appraised value of the underlying property, though its appraisals were often higher than the current depressed market values. The HOLC also benefited financially from an expanding economy, rising house prices, and falling interest rates, which lowered its funding costs, especially during World War II.
The However, the Great Depression experience may not be especially relevant for addressing how a taxpayer bailout of delinquent borrowers and their lenders would affect behavior today because of differences in the underlying causes of mortgage distress during the two periods. Conceivably, a bailout would more likely encourage risky behavior in the present situation (in which lax underwriting was an important cause of the increase in defaults) than during the Depression (when a sharp decline in economic activity was the main cause of defaults). Thus, while the federal response to mortgage distress during the Great Depression provides insights about how the government might respond to the current wave of defaults, the very different conditions underlying mortgage distress during the two periods warns against drawing strong conclusions from the historical experience for the current episode. Skilton (1944, p. 78) . (1933, 1934, 1951) , Haar (1960) , Harris (1951) , Fannie Mae website (www.fanniemae.com/about), and Wallace (1938) . 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 foreclosures per 1000 mortgages 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 
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